When François Fillon won the first round of the presidential primary of the right on November 20, 2016 with 44% of the vote, the French newspaper Libération headlined the story “The French Miracle.” The miracle was that all the polls up to the last minute had predicted he would come in third in a field of seven with little more than 10% of the vote.
This has been a bad year for pollsters, but a gap of this kind outdoes by far the far smaller predictive error in the U.S. elections. How did this happen and what does it portend for the general election to come?
The formal structure of elections in France is somewhat unusual. Unless a candidate wins over 50% of the vote on the first round (normally rather difficult to achieve), there is a second round a week later in which only those with the two highest number of votes on the first round are on the ballot. This works well if there are two main parties. In that case, the first round displays the range of views and the second round permits the smaller parties to rally round their favorite, which is supposed to be a choice between center-right and center-left.
The system breaks down when there are three parties contending, each of significant strength. This is currently the situation in France. At a national level, the three parties are currently the Socialists (center-left), the Republicans (center-right) and the National Front (far right).
The situation is even more complex because within the Republican Party, there were three main candidates: Nicolas Sarkozy, Alain Juppé, and François Fillon. Expectations had been that Sarkozy and Juppé would share the second round. This is what did not happen.
Sarkozy is a former president of France and also president of the Republican Party. Juppé and Fillon were both Prime Ministers, Juppé under Jacques Chirac and Fillon under Sarkozy. Sarkozy stood for a program that would appeal to voters attracted by the National Front and therefore would win on the second round of the national elections. Juppé stood for a program that would appeal to undecided centrist voters and even Socialist voters (both in the primary and in the general election). Almost no one paid any attention to Fillon’s program. The predictions were that Juppé would be a stronger candidate in the general elections and would therefore probably be the next president of France.
How wrong everyone was. Not only did Fillon come in first, but Juppé was next and Sarkozy only third, therefore being eliminated from the second round. Sarkozy promptly endorsed Fillon for the second round, detesting Juppé and merely scorning Fillon. The second round gave even more decisive results. Fillon got two-thirds of the vote cast.
Meanwhile, in the forthcoming primary of the left, the divisions are massive. It is probable that President François Hollande, whose figures of support are miserable and who has said he will announce whether he is standing for re-election sometime soon, will probably withdraw from the race. Otherwise, he risks the humiliation of not even winning the primary of the left. But since there is no one who stands out clearly on the left and probably no one who can rally the troops after a second round, it is likely that the left will not even have a candidate in the second round of the national elections.
If then the second round of the national elections has Fillon standing against Marine LePen of the National Front, it becomes urgent to see on what program Fillon is standing. Before the first primary, Fillon had published his three priorities, along with 15 specific measures to implement these priorities. The three were “(1) liberate the economy, (2) restore the authority of the state, to protect French persons, and (3) affirm our values.”
Translating slogans into clearer language, Fillon proposed combining a Thatcherite economic program to appeal to business-first voters, an anti-immigrant program to appeal to middle-class voters fearful of personal economic decline, and a socially-traditionalist program to appeal to right-wing Catholic voters. He had one other element in his support. Juppé had received the support of a major centrist figure, François Bayrou. But Bayrou had endorsed Hollande in the previous presidential election, and was considered a traitor by many on the right, who attributed Hollande’s defeat of Sarkozy in 2012 to Bayrou’s misdeeds.
If his combination of themes seems to you similar to those of Donald Trump and of the Brexit voters in Great Britain, you are not mistaken. The major difference lies in the two-round system in France. The question now becomes how effective LePen can be in a struggle with Fillon. The French mainstream center-left newspaper, Le Monde, warns of a weakness in the Fillon position. His support in the primary lacked what they call “the popular vote.” His support came largely from urban professionals and entrepreneurs plus retired persons. Popular classes by and large abstained from voting. Can Fillon keep these voters from finding a more adequate president in LePen?
LePen has already denounced Fillon as a spokesperson of class division, promoting the “worst such program that has ever existed.” Florian Philippot, vice-president of the National Front, thundered: “Savage globalization has its candidate; his name is François Fillon.”
Will the Fillon miracle fizzle in the general elections? Or can he find a way to get popular support, either by voting for him or at least by abstaining from voting? Whatever the outcome, France is clearly joining the rightward trend of the United States and the rest of the Global North. All eyes will now be on Germany, to see if it will resist this trend.
In a world in which almost any subject seems to arouse deep cleavages within and among countries, arguably the one that has today the deepest and geographically widest resonance is migrants. At the moment, the most acute locus of attention is Europe, where there is a vociferous debate concerning how European countries should respond to the flight to Europe of refugees, especially those from Syria but also those from Iraq and Eritrea.
The basic argument in European public debate has been one between the advocates of compassion and morality who wish to welcome additional migrants and the advocates of self-protection and cultural preservation who wish to close the door against the entry of any more. Europe is in the spotlight for the moment, but parallel debates have long been going on across the world – from the United States and Canada to South Africa, Australia, Indonesia, and Japan.
The immediate precipitant of the European debate is the massive outflow from Syria, where the deterioration of the conflict has created an acute state of personal danger for a very large percentage of the population. Syria has become a country to which it is considered against international law to return emigrants. The debate has been about what therefore to do.
There are three different ways in which one can analyze the underlying issues: in terms of the consequences of migrants for the world and national economies, for local and regional cultural identities, and for the national and world political arenas. A good part of the confusion stems from a failure to distinguish these three perspectives.
If one starts with the economic consequences, the principal question is whether taking in migrants is a plus or minus for the receiving country. The answer is that it depends on which country.
We are now familiar with the demographic transition in which the wealthier the country, the more likely it is that families with middle-level incomes will have fewer children. This is basically because reproducing for one’s child the same or higher income prospects requires a considerable investment in formal and informal education. This is financially burdensome if one does it for more than one child. In addition, improved health facilities result in longer-lived populations.
The consequence over time of a lowered birthrate and longer lives is that the demographic profile of a country becomes tilted to a higher percentage of older persons and a lengthening of the period in which a child is kept out of the active labor market. It follows that fewer persons in the active work range are supporting an increased number of persons at the older and younger age ranges.
One solution for this is to accept migrants, who can expand the proportion of the active work force and thereby ease the problem of financial support for the older and younger populations of the country. Against this argument is the assertion that the immigrants tap welfare resources and are therefore costly. But the welfare outputs seem to cost far less than the income from the active work inputs plus the additional taxes from working immigrants.
The situation is of course quite different in less wealthy countries, where the major impact of accepting migrants would be precisely to threaten the jobs of a population still willing to agree to do onerous work because of the country’s overall demographic profile.
As for the world-economy as a whole, migration merely shifts the location of individuals and probably changes very little. Migrants do however pose a global cost because of the necessity to limit the negative humanitarian consequences of enormous numbers of migrants. Just think of paying for rescuing drowning migrants who have fallen off shaky boats in the Mediterranean.
If one looks at the question from the perspective of cultural identity, the arguments are quite different. All states promote a national identity as a necessary mechanism of ensuring the primacy of allegiance. But of what national identity are we talking? Is it French-ness or Chinese-ness? Or is it Christian-ness or Buddhist-ness? This is precisely the question that differentiates the position of Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and Hungary’s President Viktor Orban. Merkel asserts that new migrants of whatever ethnic or religious origin can be integrated as German citizens. Orban sees Muslim migrants as invaders that threaten the permanence of Hungary’s Christian identity.
The debate extends beyond national boundaries. For Merkel, the migrant’s integration is not only to Germany but to Europe. For Orban, the migrant’s threat is not only to Hungary, the state, but to all of “Christian Europe.” But see the comparable debate in France about Muslim garb for women. For some, the question is not relevant if the migrants give their loyalty to France as a citizen. But for defenders of an absolute version of laicité, Muslim garb for women is totally unacceptable, violating the cultural identity of France.
There is no middle path in this kind of cultural debate. It creates an absolute impasse. And precisely because it creates an impasse, this pushes the discussion to the political arena. The ability to prevail in implementing a cultural priority depends on being able to control the political structures. Merkel and Orban, as every other politician, must obtain political support (including of course votes) or they are removed from the decision-making process. In order to maintain themselves in office, they often have to make concessions to strong currents of opinion that they do not like. This may also involve adjustments in economic policy. So, if on one day they lay out a clear line of policy, the next day they may seem to be less firm. The actors have to maneuver in a national, regional, and world political arena.
Where will Europe be ten years from now in terms of feelings about migrants? Where will the world be? It is an open question. Given the chaotic realities of a world in transition to a new historical system, we can only say that it depends on the moment-by-moment changing strengths of the contesting programs for the future. Migrants are one locus of the debate, but the debate is much wider.
In 1822, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, George Canning, sent a memo to his Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, in which he laid out what he considered, should be the basic principle of Great Britain’s foreign policy:
“[We should not consider] the wishes of any other government, or the interests of any other people, except in so far as those wishes, those feelings and those interests may, or might, concur with the just interests of England.”
At that time, Great Britain was the hegemonic power of the world-system and was able very largely to impose its wishes on the rest of the world.
Today, in the Arab countries, there is great turmoil. And, as the turmoil unfolds, there are a large number of countries which are pursuing their interests in the region. The principal problem is that there is now no hegemonic power. The consequence is a great deal of huffing and puffing, but the multiple geopolitical actors seem both hesitant and ineffectual. They talk far more than they act.
A great deal of geopolitical attention is focused on Syria, where the regime and its internal opponents have been in escalating contention for some time. Who is fighting whom and for what reasons is a matter on which the narratives of the two sides diverge totally. The Syrian government is opposed to any outside involvement in Syria’s internal struggles, whereas its opponents constantly call for such outside involvement – on their side, of course.
The United States, erstwhile hegemonic power, has called publicly for Bashar al-Assad’s renunciation as president and for a regime that the United States would consider more representatives of the Syrian people. It has in addition called upon the government to cease its internal military actions against the opposition. It has sought, unsuccessfully, to get the U.N. Security Council to adopt supportive resolutions. It has imposed unilaterally economic sanctions on Syria. It has said it would furnish humanitarian aid to Syrians inside the country and in exiles. It consults regularly with other powers about how to move forward.
What it has not done is to engage in direct military action in Syria, alone or in consort with other countries. Most recently, the U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta gave an interview to the Associated Press, in which he said that, despite constant calls for a “no-fly zone” over Syria, such plans are “not on the front burner.” To do this would require a “major, major policy decision.”
There seem to be various reasons for this. It would not have the legitimation of a Security Council resolution, as in Libya or at least as the NATO powers claimed the resolution gave them.
To be sure, the United States engaged in military action in Iraq in 2003 despite the failure to obtain a comparable U.N. resolution. However, this is the second explanation. Retrospectively, many seem to feel that the Iraqi intervention was not all that successful, and there is a fear of repeating the negative consequences of that intervention.
The third explanation is that senior U.S. military officers believe that they are already overstretched in the Middle East, and that the Syrian military would offer more serious resistance to outside intervention than Gaddafi’s military was able to offer.
The fourth explanation might be summarized as war-weariness on the part of the U.S. public. According to recent polls, a majority now consider that the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were mistakes, ones that ought not to be repeated.
A fifth explanation may be that, despite the U.S. definition of the Baathist regime as unfriendly, it seems to have serious uncertainties, perhaps grave reservations, about what would happen in Syria were the Baathist regime to fall. It worries about the possibility that an al-Qaeda-like group might obtain considerable power in a post-Baathist Syria.
It also believes there could be a power struggle among factions that would create a situation comparable to what happened in Afghanistan after the fall of the communist regime in 1992. The Alevi supporters of the present regime might retreat to their mountainous area of origin and continue fighting from there. There seems also to be a fear of oppression of the minorities by a successor regime (including of Christians).
In short, the United States is indeed pursuing its geopolitical interests. But there is considerable debate in the United States about what that interest is, and whether it has the geopolitical power to affect the situation in the direction it thinks best for the United States. The reaction of those inside Syria to U.S. actions and non-actions has been negative on both sides. The Syrian government has condemned the United States for its pressure on the president to step down. The opposition forces have publicly expressed their deception with the United States for not intervening in the way they wish, and have proclaimed that they cannot count on serious U.S. action.
The two ex-colonial powers, Great Britain and France, waffle like the United States, only more intensively. The condemnations of al-Assad were earlier and stronger. But the reluctance to consider direct military action also seems earlier and stronger. The Libyan interventions demonstrated the limits to their military effectiveness without direct U.S. collaboration.
Julian Burger, The Guardian’s diplomatic editor, wrote on Aug. 13: “The US, Britain and France are scrambling to retain their influence amid fears that most support from the Gulf States has been diverted towards extremist Islamic groups.” Berger says that Jon Wilks, Britain’s special envoy to the Syrian opposition, went to Istanbul to meet with a senior representative of the Syrian National Council. Wilks stressed two matters. Great Britain wished to keep the Syrian violence from spreading to Turkey. And Great Britain informed the opposition leaders that respect for human rights and minorities was “a condition of future cooperation.”
France’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius believes that the Sarkozy government had overinvested in the Syrian National Council, and was urging support for Manaf Tlass, a prominent Sunni military defector from the regime. The problem for Great Britain and France, as for the United States, is not only whom to support and what form of support to offer but also whether they have the clout to affect the internal situation significantly.
Do the Gulf States have this clout? They too are pursuing their own geopolitical interests. However, the two most active states, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are not pursuing identical policies.
Qatar has been quite open about supplying funds and arms to opponents of the Syrian regime, perhaps especially to Salafist and jihadist groups. Qatar has been attempting for over a decade now to become a major player in the Middle East, replicating the role it played in Libya with a similar role in Syria. In pursuing this policy, is it not also trying to forestall any putative Saudi attempt to absorb all the Gulf States?
And Saudi Arabia? It seems as ambivalent as the United States. Saudi Arabia projects itself as the defender of Sunni Muslims everywhere, especially against Shi’a, and notably against Iran. But not all Sunni Muslims accept a Saudi leadership role, given their commitment to Wahhabi Islam. The Saudi regime does not regard all Sunni Muslims with a complacent, indulgent eye.
Saudi Arabia has great difficulties ensuring such a leadership role. The Saudi regime worries about two other Sunni forces strengthening their Middle Eastern position. The Muslim Brotherhood espouses a different version of Sunni orthodoxy. Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s locus classicus remains politically and theologically in Egypt. Its current revival in Egypt (as well as elsewhere) may permit Egypt to resume its erstwhile role as the primary state in the Arab world eclipsing Saudi Arabia.
Worse yet, for the Saudis, is the renewed strength of al-Qaeda, which is committed to overthrowing the Saudi regime it considers corrupt and un-Islamic.
The Saudi problem in Syria is that the opposition groups are under Brotherhood and/or al-Qaeda and/or secularist leadership – none of which makes the Saudis rejoice. So, despite their wish to clip the wings of Iran and their vocal assumption of guarantor of Sunni Islam, it is not sure that they have been supplying many arms to the opposition forces.
Turkey’s importance in the region has steadily grown. Its desire to be a major player absorbs ever more of their diplomacy. But it is hard to know exactly what policy Turkey is pursuing. It is clear that they have become quite critical of al-Assad and the Baathist regime. They make statements that are increasingly similar to those made by U.S. leaders. They offer refuge (albeit a very cramped refuge) to opposition Syrians who wish to cross the border.
But they also insist that Syrian opposition forces may not organize violence from within Turkish borders. The Turks resist the talk of a no fly zone. The support they seem to be giving the opposition is rhetorical and humanitarian, but not military. Furthermore, the Turkish government is preoccupied with the Kurdish movements, both inside Turkey and in neighbouring countries, including of course Syria. Kurds in Syria seem to have taken advantage of the turmoil to organize control over Kurdish areas. And the Baathist regime is unwilling (or perhaps unable) to curb this. This both upsets and rattles the Turkish government. Once again, therefore, more talk than action.
Egypt’s primary object is reestablishment as the leading Arab country. For this, the new regime will seek to recalibrate its relations to the key issue, Palestine, without too strongly breaking from the United States. Syria is secondary in this delicate task.
Iraq and Jordan find themselves in dilemmas, worrying that the Syrian turmoil may affect their own fragile internal stability. They both accept opposition Syrian refugees, but both seem to force them into tightly controlled camps, denying these refugees any political/military activity. This has led to some of the exiles actually returning to Syria, feeling they are more comfortable there. The Palestinians share this same prudent attitude.
Lebanon’s prime geopolitical interest is to maintain the extremely delicate current internal arrangements. But given the close ties the various Lebanese groups have to forces in Syria, it seems very difficult to maintain a neutral stance. France is strongly urging them to do just that.
Israel cannot be ignored as an actor. For some time now, the Israeli regime has made its number one concern the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. It is not obvious that they can prevent that – precisely what worries them. Where does Syria, Iran’s key geopolitical ally, fit into this picture? Syria has also been de facto a relatively calm neighbour of Israel. While Israel wants to weaken Iran (and the fall of the regime would no doubt do that), it is aware that the forces that would replace the regime would likely be far less of a relatively calm neighbour. This makes Israel almost mute on the Syrian turmoil.
Iran, a giant in the region, seeks geopolitical recognition of its right to inclusion in decision-making about the region’s future, specifically including Syria. This is exactly what the United States and Israel refuse Iran. So, Iran has nothing to lose and everything to gain by working to sustain the Syrian regime, and offering itself as a key “honest broker” in Syria.
Russia and China have concrete concerns – naval bases, energy resources. But there are graver issues for them. They have been insisting that what happened in Libya cannot be allowed to happen again. They believe that Great Britain, France, and the United States used an ambiguous U.N. resolution to use military force to overthrow the regimes and reinforce thereby their geopolitical interests.
They perceive the United States as an erstwhile hegemonic power that is not yet ready to acknowledge its decline, which unwillingness they see as the greatest danger in the region. They use their veto in the Security Council to prevent a potential collapse of order in the whole region. They have no particular fondness for al-Assad or the Baathist regime per se. They await their opportunity to work for a political solution to Syria’s internal conflicts.
The principal conclusion from this survey is that the various powers neutralize each other. None today has much ability to affect Syria’s internal politics. They are all condemned to talk more than they act. The consequences of this geopolitical impasse for internal developments in Syria remain therefore very uncertain. In the end, the internal actors are very much on their own.Read full article as PDF
The turmoil in Arab countries that is called the Arab Spring is conventionally said to have been sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in a small village of Tunisia on December 17, 2010. The massive sympathy this act aroused led, in a relatively short time, to the destitution of Tunisia’s president and then to that of Egypt’s president. In very quick order thereafter, the turmoil spread to virtually every Arab state and is still continuing.
Most of the analyses we read in the media or on the internet neglect the fundamental contradiction of this phenomenon – that the so-called Arab Spring is composed of two quite different currents, going in radically different directions. One current is the heir of the world-revolution of 1968. The “1968 current” might better be called the “second Arab revolt”.
Its objective is to achieve the global autonomy of the Arab world that the “first Arab revolt” had sought to achieve. The first revolt failed primarily because of successful Franco-British measures to contain it, co-opt it, and repress it.
The second current is the attempt by all important geopolitical actors to control the first current, each acting to divert collective activity in the Arab world in ways that would redound to the relative advantage of each of these actors separately. The actors here regard the “1968 current” as highly dangerous to their interests. They have done everything possible to turn attention and energy away from the objectives of the “1968 current”, in what I think of as the great distraction.Read full article as PDF
The phrase “the Cold War” refers to a narrative that was intended to and is supposed to summarize how we are to understand a geopolitical reality over the period of time running approximately from 1945 to 1991. This narrative is today very widely accepted. It originated with political leaders. It was adopted by scholars. And it was intended to influence the thinking of everyone else. It has been the dominant narrative, although there have been some dissenters.
In this essay I would like to review this narrative and what it is supposed to tell us. It tells us that the Second World War was a war that was started by Germany and Japan as aggressor nations that sought to conquer other nations. They did fairly well at first, but then resistance to them grew stronger. In 1941, both the Soviet Union and the United States entered the war against Germany, and the coalition took on the name of the United Nations. The three countries in this alliance that were most signify cant militarily were the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. They were called the “Big Three,” and together they won the Second World War.Read full article as PDF
Theory Talks proudly presents a Talk with historical sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein is duly known for his world-system theory, with which he offers a critical alternative to realist systemic approaches to International Relations. One could say that where Realists part from the system to analyze and predict history, world-system theory parts from history to analyze and predict the system. In this comprehensive Talk, Wallerstein – amongst others – explains why capitalism is worn out, why ’68 was more important then ’45 or ’89, and why we need to overcome artificial divorces between different arenas in social sciences and, more generally, between philosophy and science.Read full article as PDF
Andre Gunder Frank’s very long itinerary as a critical social scientist was marked by one unbudgeable constant. He was always committed to a left political agenda, and he was always analyzing the evolving current world situation as a left scholar-activist. I believe that the best tribute I can offer him is to do the same. Gunder’s father, Leonhard Frank, a distinguished novelist and man of letters, wrote toward the end of his life a novel based on his own life. Its title was Links, wo das Herz ist (“My Heart Is on the Left”). This would have been the most appropriate title for Gunder’s own never-written autobiography.Read full article as PDF
As recently as 2003, it was considered absurd to talk of the decline of the United States. Now, however, such a belief has become common currency among theorists, policymakers, and the media. what significantly raised the awareness of this concept was, of course, the fiasco of the United States’ preemptive invasion of Iraq. What is not yet sufficiently appreciated is the precise nature of this decline and when it specifically began.
Most analysts contend that the United States was at its hegemonic apex in the post-1991 era when the world was marked by unipolarity, as contrasted with the bipolar structure that existed during the Cold war. But this notion has reality absolutely backwards. the United States was the sole hegemonic power from 1945 to approximately 1970. Its hegemony has been in decline ever since. the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major blow to US power in the world. And the invasion of Iraq in 2003 transformed the situation from one of slow decline into one of precipitous collapse. By 2007, the United States had lost its credibility not only as the economic and political leader of the world-system, but also as the dominant military power. Since I am aware that this is not the standard picture either in the media or in scholarly literature, let me spell this out in some detail. I shall divide this ac-count into three periods: 1945-1970, 1970-2001, and 2001 to the present. they correspond to the period of US hegemony, that of slow US decline giving rise to a creeping multipolarity, and that of the precipitate decline and effective multipolarity of the era inaugurated by US President George W. Bush.Read full article as PDF